# Copyright (c) The btclib developers
# Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
# LICENSE file or https://opensource.org/license/mit for the full text.
"""Number theory and modular arithmetic functions.
Implementations originally from
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Algorithm_Implementation/Mathematics/Extended_Euclidean_algorithm
and
https://codereview.stackexchange.com/questions/43210/tonelli_var-shanks-algorithm-implementation-of-prime-modular-square-root/43267
with the following modifications:
* type annotated Python3
* minor improvements
* added extensive unit test
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import math
import secrets
import sys
from collections.abc import Sequence
from math import isqrt
from typing import cast
from ecc._utils import hex_string, is_integer
from ecc.alias import Public
from ecc.exceptions import EccTypeError, EccValueError
# the `gmpy2` extra, which a plain install does not have. A gmpy2 that is
# installed and fails to import is not absent, and raises. Off CPython gmpy2
# is not used even where installed, for the reason pyproject.toml gives at the
# extra
if sys.implementation.name == "cpython":
try:
from gmpy2 import mpz # type: ignore[import-untyped]
_FIELD_TYPES: tuple[type, ...] = (mpz,)
except (
ModuleNotFoundError
) as exc: # pragma: no cover -- only an interpreter without gmpy2 reaches this
if exc.name != "gmpy2":
raise
mpz = None
_FIELD_TYPES = ()
else: # pragma: no cover -- only PyPy reaches this, and coverage is measured on CPython
mpz = None
_FIELD_TYPES = ()
__all__ = [
"legendre_symbol_var",
"mod_inv",
"mod_inv_batch",
"mod_inv_batch_var",
"mod_inv_var",
"mod_sqrt_var",
"tonelli_var",
"xgcd_var",
]
def _assert_valid_operand(a: int) -> None:
"""Refuse an operand that is not an integer, a bool not being one.
A float goes through every function here without complaint --
`//`, `%` and `*` are all defined for it -- and comes back out of a
signature that says `int`: `mod_inv_var(3.0, 7)` answers `5.0`, which is
not a residue and not an error either. `is_integer` is the check, and
its docstring says why a bool is excluded.
gmpy2's mpz is an integer too, where the package uses gmpy2 (on CPython,
where it is installed): it is what `_field_element` makes of a curve's
modulus, and an operand of that type comes back as one.
"""
if not (is_integer(a) or isinstance(a, _FIELD_TYPES)):
raise EccTypeError(f"not an integer: {type(a).__name__}")
def _field_element(i: int) -> int:
"""Return i as gmpy2's mpz where the `gmpy2` extra is installed.
i itself where it is not. A curve converts its modulus once, and a
product reduced by an mpz is an mpz, so its group law then runs on GMP.
The annotation says int: the operators the group law applies, and `pow`,
answer an mpz as they answer an int. It is not an int subclass, so what
leaves the package is converted back with `int`.
"""
return i if mpz is None else cast("int", mpz(i))
def _assert_valid_modulus(m: int) -> None:
"""Refuse a modulus nothing is a residue of.
Positive, not merely non-zero: zero is the `ZeroDivisionError` of
`a %= m` and the `ValueError` `pow` raises for a third argument of
zero, neither of which a caller writing `except EccValueError`
catches, and a negative modulus would answer with a negative residue
class that no caller of this module has a use for.
"""
_assert_valid_operand(m)
if m < 1:
raise EccValueError(f"non-positive modulus: {m}")
# every public function here checks its own arguments, rather than five
# private twins doing the work unchecked for the ones that call each
# other: a pair of isinstance calls is a small fraction of the arithmetic
# it stands in front of, an inverse modulo a 256-bit prime being an
# extended Euclid even when C runs it, so the re-checking mod_sqrt_var does
# through tonelli_var and legendre_symbol_var costs less than five more names
# would
[docs]
def xgcd_var(a: Public, b: Public) -> tuple[int, int, int]:
"""Return (g, x, y) such that a*x + b*y = g = gcd(x, y).
based on Extended Euclidean Algorithm, see
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Algorithm_Implementation/Mathematics/Extended_Euclidean_algorithm
"""
_assert_valid_operand(a)
_assert_valid_operand(b)
x0, x1, y0, y1 = 0, 1, 1, 0
r0: int = b
r1: int = a
while r1 != 0:
q, r0, r1 = r0 // r1, r1, r0 % r1
y0, y1 = y1, y0 - q * y1
x0, x1 = x1, x0 - q * x1
return r0, x0, y0
def _no_inverse(m: int) -> EccValueError:
"""Return the error for an operand with no inverse mod m.
The operand is not named: it may be a secret.
"""
err_msg = "no inverse mod "
# int(): m may be gmpy2's mpz, which hex_string refuses
err_msg += (
f"{hex_string(int(m))}" if m > 0xFFFFFFFF else f"{m}"
) # sourcery skip: remove-unnecessary-cast
return EccValueError(err_msg)
def _blinding_factor(m: int) -> int:
"""Return a random nonzero factor mod m.
m == 1 has only the factor 1, every integer being zero modulo it.
"""
return 1 + secrets.randbelow(m - 1) if m > 1 else 1
[docs]
def mod_inv_var(a: Public, m: int) -> int:
"""Return the inverse of a (mod m).
m does not have to be a prime.
`pow(a, -1, m)` is an Extended Euclidean Algorithm too: on an int,
CPython's `long_invmod`, which is the loop `xgcd_var` runs with the
second cofactor dropped; on gmpy2's mpz, GMP's `mpz_invert`. Either way
it delegates the algorithm to C rather than interpreting it, and that is
the whole of why it is called. It is not
a constant-time inverse and neither was the bytecode one; SECURITY.md
publishes the Python path as variable-time.
Its duration follows the operand, so a secret one goes to
`mod_inv` instead: what that duration carries is described
there, and it is enough to recover a private key from a signature.
What `pow` does not carry is this module's contract, so the checks
stay above it and the message below it: a non-invertible operand
leaves `pow` as a bare `ValueError` naming neither operand, and
rebuilding the message says more than chaining that one would.
"""
_assert_valid_operand(a)
_assert_valid_modulus(m)
try:
return pow(a, -1, m)
except ValueError:
raise _no_inverse(m) from None
[docs]
def mod_inv(a: int, m: int) -> int:
"""Return the inverse of a (mod m), timed on a random value instead.
What `mod_inv_var` is for an operand that is public, this is for one
that is secret. The extended Euclid under that one takes the
iterations its input asks for, and for an operand drawn uniformly
below m what its duration carries is the operand's bit-length: on
secp256k1's order a 256-bit scalar takes longer than a 128-bit one,
falling at every step between them. That correlation is
what the Minerva attack collects -- an ECDSA nonce is
such a scalar, and a few thousand signing times sorted by it are a
lattice away from the private key.
(b*a)^-1 * b is a^-1 for every b invertible mod m, so drawing b at
random leaves an inverse whose iteration count follows b and tells an
observer nothing about a. What it adds is two multiplications, two
reductions and a draw from `secrets`. Fermat's `pow(a, m - 2, m)` is
the alternative and is flat for a different reason, its ladder
running on the fixed exponent rather than on a random operand; it is
not the one chosen.
The draw is what costs, so a small modulus pays proportionally more:
on an order of 11 the Euclid is a few iterations and `secrets` is the
same syscall. Nothing signs with such an order outside the test
suite.
Not a constant-time inverse, and no more claiming to be one than
`curve_group._blinded_jac` does: the duration is still an extended
Euclid's and still visible, and what the blinding changes is whose it
is. SECURITY.md publishes the Python path as variable-time, and
CONTRIBUTING.md has what a name in this library does and does not
promise about duration.
m does not have to be a prime, and the blinding holds for any m.
The factor's gcd with m, a second Euclid timed on the secret factor,
is taken only when the product has no inverse: a factor that is not
a unit, which only a composite m draws, is then redrawn, and an
operand with no inverse raises. The expected number of draws is
(m - 1) / phi(m). `mod_inv_var` is never handed the operand itself.
"""
_assert_valid_operand(a)
_assert_valid_modulus(m)
while True:
b = _blinding_factor(m)
try:
return mod_inv_var(Public(a * b % m), m) * b % m
except EccValueError:
# the product has no inverse: b is a zero divisor, which only
# a composite m has, or a has none. In the first case redraw;
# in the second raise about the operand, not the product the
# caller never formed, without inverting the operand
if math.gcd(b, m) == 1:
raise _no_inverse(m) from None
[docs]
def mod_inv_batch(a: Sequence[int], m: int) -> list[int]:
"""Return every inverse, each timed on a random value instead.
What `mod_inv` is to `mod_inv_var`, this is to `mod_inv_batch_var`:
the twin a secret may be handed. Montgomery's trick inverts one
running product for the whole sequence, so the single extended Euclid
it spends is timed on a value every element went into -- which is the
channel, the same one and no smaller for being shared.
Each element is blinded with a factor of its own rather than the
sequence with one: `inv(a_i * b_i) * b_i` is `inv(a_i)`, and the
product the batch forms is then a product of blinded values. One
factor for all of them would blind that product and leave the ratios
`a_i / a_j` in the peeled-back inverses, which is what the running
products are made of.
So it costs `n` draws from `secrets` and 2n multiplications on top of
the trick.
It is still the trick, which is the point of it being a batch at all:
one extended Euclid for the whole sequence, where `mod_inv` on each
element spends one each.
On a composite modulus a factor can be a zero divisor, and an element
can have no inverse: either fails the batch, which is then answered
by `mod_inv` on each element in turn, so the cost is at worst n
independent calls.
Not constant-time, for the reasons `mod_inv` gives at length. The
empty sequence is not an error here either.
"""
_assert_valid_modulus(m)
for x in a:
_assert_valid_operand(x)
if not a:
return []
# a factor each, as `mod_inv` draws its one
factors = [_blinding_factor(m) for _ in a]
blinded = [Public(x * b % m) for x, b in zip(a, factors, strict=True)]
try:
inverses = mod_inv_batch_var(blinded, m)
except EccValueError:
# a product has no inverse: a factor is a zero divisor, or an
# element has none. One at a time, each element draws a factor of
# its own and redraws its own zero divisors, or raises: n
# independent calls, where redrawing the whole batch until every
# factor is a unit would take exponentially many rounds in n. No
# gcd is taken of the batch factors, and none of them is kept
return [mod_inv(x, m) for x in a]
return [i * b % m for i, b in zip(inverses, factors, strict=True)]
[docs]
def mod_inv_batch_var(a: Sequence[Public], m: int) -> list[int]:
"""Return the inverse of every element of a (mod m), in its order.
m does not have to be a prime, and every element has to be invertible
modulo it, as `mod_inv_var` requires of its one operand.
Montgomery's trick, which libsecp256k1 runs inside
`secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var`: the running products a[0], a[0]*a[1],
..., a[0]*...*a[n-1] are formed, the last of them is inverted once,
and the individual inverses are peeled back off it. So n inverses
cost one inverse and 3(n-1) products, where n calls to `mod_inv_var`
are n extended Euclids -- an inverse modulo a 256-bit prime being,
on an int, some thirty times a product.
An empty sequence has no inverses and is not an error: it is what a
caller that filtered its own input is left with.
"""
_assert_valid_modulus(m)
for x in a:
_assert_valid_operand(x)
if not a:
return []
# the running products, the last of which is the one to invert
acc: list[int] = []
product = 1
for x in a:
product = product * x % m
acc.append(product)
try:
inv = pow(product, -1, m)
except ValueError:
# a product is invertible only if every factor is, so at least one
# element is not: inverting them one at a time reaches it and
# answers `mod_inv_var`'s own message, naming the operand rather than
# the product a caller never formed
return [mod_inv_var(x, m) for x in a]
# and peeled back off it, from the last element to the first: the
# inverse of the whole product times the product of everything before
# element i is the inverse of element i
inverses = [0] * len(a)
for i in range(len(a) - 1, 0, -1):
inverses[i] = inv * acc[i - 1] % m
inv = inv * a[i] % m
inverses[0] = inv
return inverses
[docs]
def legendre_symbol_var(a: Public, p: int) -> int:
"""Compute the Legendre symbol a|p, as a binary Jacobi symbol.
p is a prime, a is relatively prime to p (if p divides a, then a|p =
0). It returns 1 if a has a square root modulo p, -1 otherwise. The
Jacobi symbol is what is computed, and for a prime modulus the two
are the same number.
By the reciprocity recursion rather than by Euler's criterion, which
is `pow(a, (p - 1) // 2, p)` -- an exponentiation the size of the
square root the caller is asking about, where this is a gcd. The
factors of two come out all at once, `a & -a` being the lowest set
bit, which is libsecp256k1's `secp256k1_ctz64_var`; asking a gcd
rather than an exponent is what its `secp256k1_fe_is_square_var`
does, through `secp256k1_jacobi64_maybe_var` and never through a
power. Its own recursion is the safegcd one, which in bytecode loses
as every safegcd does -- `curves.curve_group_2` keeps the list.
The loop's length follows `a`, where an exponentiation's did not.
SECURITY.md publishes the Python path as variable-time, and nothing
in the tree asks this about a value that has to stay hidden.
`curves.curve._is_x_coordinate_var` reaches it for a signature's r,
the x-coordinate of a serialized xpub, or the -x-u that an
ElligatorSwift encoding is tested against, and `ecc.ellswift`
reaches it directly for the fractions and radicands its map and its
inverse test, each of them public and on secp256k1 each answered by
the bindings before this is reached;
`ecc.pedersen` and `ecc.rangeproof` reach it for the residuosity
octet of a point they are about to write down.
"""
_assert_valid_operand(a)
_assert_valid_modulus(p)
x = a % p
result = 1
while x:
# every factor of two at once, and the symbol 2|p is -1 for a p
# of 3 or 5 mod 8, so only an odd count of them turns the sign
twos = (x & -x).bit_length() - 1
x >>= twos
if twos & 1 and p & 7 in {3, 5}:
result = -result
# quadratic reciprocity: the operands swap, and the sign turns
# when both of them are 3 mod 4
if x & 3 == 3 and p & 3 == 3:
result = -result
x, p = p % x, x
# what is left is the gcd, and a symbol is zero when it is not one:
# for a prime p that is a multiple of p, which has no square root
# and is not a non-residue either
return result if p == 1 else 0
# secp256k1's field prime, spelled here because `curves` imports this module
_SECP256K1_P = 2**256 - 2**32 - 977
def _sqrt_candidate_secp256k1(a: int) -> int:
"""Return a ** ((p + 1) // 4) mod secp256k1's p, for a in 0..p-1.
The addition chain of `secp256k1_fe_sqrt` in libsecp256k1 (v0.8.0,
`field_impl.h`): the three blocks of 1s in the exponent, of 2, 22 and
223 bits, are built as 2^n - 1 powers. It is faster than
`pow(a, (p + 1) // 4, p)`; btclib-org/ecc#191 holds the script
that measures it.
"""
p = _SECP256K1_P
def sq(x: int, n: int) -> int:
for _ in range(n):
x = x * x % p
return x
x2 = sq(a, 1) * a % p
x3 = sq(x2, 1) * a % p
x6 = sq(x3, 3) * x3 % p
x9 = sq(x6, 3) * x3 % p
x11 = sq(x9, 2) * x2 % p
x22 = sq(x11, 11) * x11 % p
x44 = sq(x22, 22) * x22 % p
x88 = sq(x44, 44) * x44 % p
x176 = sq(x88, 88) * x88 % p
x220 = sq(x176, 44) * x44 % p
x223 = sq(x220, 3) * x3 % p
t = sq(x223, 23) * x22 % p
t = sq(t, 6) * x2 % p
return sq(t, 2)
[docs]
def mod_sqrt_var(a: Public, p: int) -> int:
"""Return a quadratic residue (mod p) of a; p must be a prime.
Solve the equation:
x^2 = a mod p
and return x; p - x is also a root.
If a simple solution is not available for p,
then the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm is used.
https://codereview.stackexchange.com/questions/43210/tonelli_var-shanks-algorithm-implementation-of-prime-modular-square-root/43267
"""
_assert_valid_operand(a)
_assert_valid_modulus(p)
a_p = a % p
if p == _SECP256K1_P:
r = _sqrt_candidate_secp256k1(a_p)
elif p % 4 == 3:
# inverse candidate is pow(a, (p + 1) // 4, p)
r = pow(a_p, (p >> 2) + 1, p)
elif p % 8 == 5:
# inverse candidate is pow(a, (p + 3) // 8, p)
r = pow(a_p, (p >> 3) + 1, p)
if r * r % p == a_p:
return r
# another inverse candidate
r = r * pow(2, p >> 2, p) % p
else:
return tonelli_var(Public(a_p), p)
if r * r % p != a_p:
err_msg = "no root mod "
# int(): p may be gmpy2's mpz, which hex_string refuses
err_msg += (
f"'{hex_string(int(p))}'" if p > 0xFFFFFFFF else f"{p}"
) # sourcery skip: remove-unnecessary-cast
raise EccValueError(err_msg)
return r
[docs]
def tonelli_var(a: Public, p: int) -> int:
"""Return a quadratic residue (mod p) of a; p must be a prime.
The Tonelli-Shanks algorithm is used.
https://codereview.stackexchange.com/questions/43210/tonelli_var-shanks-algorithm-implementation-of-prime-modular-square-root/43267
"""
_assert_valid_operand(a)
_assert_valid_modulus(p)
a_p = a % p
if a_p == 0 or p == 2:
return a_p
# Check solution existence for an odd prime p
if legendre_symbol_var(Public(a_p), p) != 1:
err_msg = "no root mod "
# int(): p may be gmpy2's mpz, which hex_string refuses
err_msg += (
f"'{hex_string(int(p))}'" if p > 0xFFFFFFFF else f"{p}"
) # sourcery skip: remove-unnecessary-cast
raise EccValueError(err_msg)
# Factor p-1 on the form q * 2^s (with q odd)
q, s = p - 1, 0
while q & 1 == 0:
s += 1
q >>= 1
if s == 1:
return pow(a_p, (p + 1) // 4, p)
# Select a z which is a quadratic non residue modulo p, from the
# first value that can be one: 1 is a square modulo every prime, so
# its symbol is known before the loop asks for it. A genuine prime
# always has one below it, half its nonzero residues being
# non-residues; z reaching p without meeting one is the same
# violation of "p must be a prime" the t loop below raises on, and it
# is what a p that is a perfect square does, its Jacobi symbol never
# being -1.
z = 2
while legendre_symbol_var(Public(z), p) != -1:
z += 1
if z == p:
err_msg = "p is not prime: "
# int(): p may be gmpy2's mpz, which hex_string refuses
err_msg += (
f"'{hex_string(int(p))}'" if p > 0xFFFFFFFF else f"{p}"
) # sourcery skip: remove-unnecessary-cast
raise EccValueError(err_msg)
c = pow(z, q, p)
r = pow(a_p, (q + 1) // 2, p)
t = pow(a_p, q, p)
while t != 1:
# Find the lowest i such that t^(2^i) = 1
t2i = t
# For a genuine prime p this always finds such an i: the
# legendre symbol above rules out a == 0, and `a` being a
# quadratic residue makes `t = a**q` an element of the subgroup
# of order 2**(s-1), so squaring it reaches 1 at some i < s.
# Where p is not prime, the legendre symbol above is only a
# Jacobi symbol and does not rule this out, so the loop's
# exhaustion -- `for`/`else` running with no `break` -- is the
# same violation of "p must be a prime" the z search above
# raises on, rather than a case left for the `while` above to
# loop on forever.
for i in range(1, s):
t2i = t2i * t2i % p
if t2i == 1:
# Update next value to iterate
b = pow(c, 1 << (s - i - 1), p)
r = (r * b) % p
c = (b * b) % p
t = (t * c) % p
s = i
break
else:
err_msg = "p is not prime: "
# int(): p may be gmpy2's mpz, which hex_string refuses
err_msg += (
f"'{hex_string(int(p))}'" if p > 0xFFFFFFFF else f"{p}"
) # sourcery skip: remove-unnecessary-cast
raise EccValueError(err_msg)
return r
def _jacobi_var(a: Public, n: int) -> int:
"""Return the Jacobi symbol (a/n), for n odd and positive."""
x = a % n
result = 1
while x:
while x % 2 == 0:
x //= 2
if n % 8 in (3, 5):
result = -result
x, n = n, x
if x % 4 == 3 and n % 4 == 3:
result = -result
x %= n
return result if n == 1 else 0
def _is_strong_probable_prime_base_2_var(n: Public) -> bool:
"""Return True if the odd n > 2 is a strong probable prime to base 2."""
d = n - 1
s = (d & -d).bit_length() - 1
d >>= s
x = pow(2, d, n)
if x in (1, n - 1):
return True
for _ in range(s - 1):
x = x * x % n
if x == n - 1:
return True
return False
def _is_strong_lucas_probable_prime_var(n: Public) -> bool:
"""Return True if the odd n > 2 is a strong Lucas probable prime.
Selfridge's method A picks the parameters: D is the first of 5, -7, 9,
-11, ... with Jacobi symbol (D/n) = -1, then P = 1 and Q = (1 - D)/4.
"""
if isqrt(n) ** 2 == n:
return False
D = 5
while (j := _jacobi_var(Public(D), n)) == 1:
D = -D - 2 if D > 0 else -D + 2
if j == 0:
# D has a factor in common with n: n is composite, |D| being < n
return False
Q = (1 - D) // 4
# U_k, V_k and Q^k for k = 1, then for the binary digits of d below
# the leading one: k -> 2k, and k -> 2k + 1 for a digit 1
d = n + 1
s = (d & -d).bit_length() - 1
d >>= s
U, V, Qk = 1, 1, Q % n
for bit in bin(d)[3:]:
U = U * V % n
V = (V * V - 2 * Qk) % n
Qk = Qk * Qk % n
if bit == "1":
U, V = U + V, D * U + V
U = (U + n if U % 2 else U) // 2 % n
V = (V + n if V % 2 else V) // 2 % n
Qk = Qk * Q % n
if U == 0 or V == 0:
return True
for _ in range(s - 1):
V = (V * V - 2 * Qk) % n
Qk = Qk * Qk % n
if V == 0:
return True
return False
def _is_prime_var(x: Public) -> bool:
"""Return True if x is an odd prime, by the Baillie-PSW test.
Trial division by the primes up to 37, then a strong probable prime test
to base 2, then a strong Lucas test with Selfridge's parameters (Baillie
and Wagstaff, "Lucas pseudoprimes", Mathematics of Computation 35, 1980).
No composite below 2^64 passes: Feitsma and Galway listed the base-2
pseudoprimes below it, and Gilchrist checked that none passes the Lucas
test. Above 2^64 none is known, which is not a proof.
Two answers False, being even, and neither caller wants it otherwise:
the short Weierstrass equation defines no curve in characteristic 2,
and a subgroup of order 2 holds one point besides infinity.
Private: it is the test for a curve's p and n, which a caller states
and does not search for, and the module's public functions take a
prime on trust.
"""
if x < 3 or x % 2 == 0:
return False
for q in (3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37):
if x % q == 0:
return x == q
return _is_strong_probable_prime_base_2_var(
x
) and _is_strong_lucas_probable_prime_var(x)